An Annotated Bibliography Jennifer Borgerding Academic affiliation: Oklahoma State University ©Read the copyright notice at the bottom of this page before reproducing this essay/webpage on paper, or electronically, or in any other form. |
Attas, Daniel. "Freedom and Self-Ownership." Social Theory and Practice 26.1 (2000): 1-23. Proquest. Oklahoma State University Library. Article 55126734. 30 Sept. 2003 http://proquest.umi.com. The purpose of this article is to prove self-ownership as a proprietor of slavery, and claim Original Freedom as the more perceivably acceptable of the two. The author accomplishes this by first examining and disproving two arguments that justify the principle of self-ownership, then proposes that "self-ownership is an adequate interpretation of the Kantian principle of always treating persons as ends in themselves" (Attas 2). The author persuasively ends his article by introducing the concept of Original Freedom. He provides an extensive amount of resources, G.A. Cohen, John Christman, F. S. Lucash, and Philippe Van Parijs to name a few, to support his claim that Original Freedom is the most justified freedom without demand to distributive factor.
Christman, John. The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership. New York: Oxford U P, 1994. The author seeks to accomplish four main ideas: to explore the concept and structure of ownership, to present a strong argument for removing the liberal conception of property, to put forward an alternative conception of ownership, and to look at the implications of this alternative. The book, in the end, poses a challenge to liberal conception of property and introduces a basis for avenues of future research. However, the key implication is the fundamental vagueness of the concept of property, because the fundamental reason for any particular notion of property or structure of property rights is the idea that the more specified the property rights the more conflict there is within a society.
Clayton, Mathew. "Liberal Equality and Ethics." Ethics 113 (2002): 8-22. The purpose the author makes clear is to refute Ronald Dworkin on many of his concepts including envy and luck. The author divided his article into five sections: I Liberal Equality, II Equality of Resources and Political Liberalism, III Ethical Grounds for Liberal Equality, IV The Challenge Model and the Goods of Identification, and lastly V Liberal Equality as a Parameter. Although the author did not include an introduction to preface his argument and make it more clear to the reader, he did use a considerable amount of research to support his refutes of Dworkin's claims that successfully convey Clayton's ideas.
Cohen, G. A. Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality. New York: Cambridge U, 1995. The purpose of the book is to undertake a detailed criticism of a "self-ownership" thesis that underlies Robert Nozick's libertarian defense of capitalism. He accomplishes this by arguing that the principle of self-ownership undermines equality, personal freedom, and self-sufficiency. The author claims that it violates the most fundamental political value of justice. Throughout the book, the author successfully shows a deductive method of analysis. He also shows the contrasting views between Nozick and Rawls, R.M. Dworkin, and others, giving his argument a more skillful and serious critique of libertarianism.
Dworkin, Ronald. "Sovereign Virtue Revisited." Ethics 113 (2003): 106-143. The author begins by addressing familiar arguments over the aspects dealing with the nature of liberty and of equality, distributive and political. He also expounds upon the less familiar claims of liberal understandings of community and the good life. Dworkin makes his claims by contrasting the views of mostly John Rawls and Isaiah Berlin. Out of theses, one can see that Dworkin makes no conflict between liberty and equality. He also argues that liberalism's ethical foundation must be built on critical rather that violational interests. Throughout this article, the author offers and somewhat acknowledges more of a classical foundations account of ethics and politics.
Otsuka, Michael. "Luck, Insurance, and Equality." Ethics 113 (2002): 40-54. The author makes it clear that the purpose of his article is to focus wholly on refuting Ronald Dworkin's claim "that the provision of an equal opportunity to insure against risks is sufficient to render differences in people's circumstances that are the result of luck consistent with his theory of equality of resources" (Otsuka 43). To better follow the author's ideas, he divided it into two sections. The first was to assert that bad brute luck is sometimes the result of vicissitude of nature, and the second is to address that bad brute luck is sometimes the result of a choice an individual makes. Although the author's aim is mainly to refute Dworkin, he does not use many resources to support his claims.
Otsuka, Michael. "Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation." Philosophy and Public Affairs. 27:1 (1998): 65-93. Proquest. Oklahoma State University Library. Article 30078663. 30 Sept. 2003 http://proquest.umi.com. The author's precise thesis "Barring unusual circumstances, equality of access to welfare among individuals who differ in their capacity to derive welfare from resources can in principle be achieved through an egalitarian distribution of initially unowned worldly resources" (Otsuka 65), shows that the author believes that the arguments between libertarians and egalitarians are mostly illusions and can be reconciled through the works of John Locke. The author presents ideal situations and provides much support, mostly from John Locke, C. A. Cohen, and Robert Nozick, but even though he has an ample amount of support his ideals are unrealistic of today's society.
Steiner, Hillel. "The Natural Right to the Means of Production." The Philosophical Quarterly 26.106 (1977): 41-49. The author states observing an explosion of rights over the past few decades that clashes with the older human rights of classical liberals. The author points out that the reason for rights was to guide persons as to which dealings are allowed in order to evade conflicts among persons and to permit each person his freedom. He goes on to point out that the word "right" has become synonymous for interest or benefit which is a conflict in itself because interests and benefits vary among people. The author clearly analyzes the misguided rights theory and brings to light the original definition of "rights".
Temkin, Larry S. "Egalitarianism Defended." Ethics 113 (2003): 764-783. The purpose of this article is to obviously defend Egalitarianism by showing both its nature and appeal to the reader. The author effectively accomplishes this by referring to Roger Crisp's "Equality, Priority, and Compassion" article which opposes the views of Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, and by responding to Crisp's Beverly Hills Case which also is directed against Prioritarianism and threatens Egalitarianism as well. Although, Crisp's article and Beverly Hills Case challenges the author's views, Temkin raises significant doubts to Crisp's rejection of Egalitarianism by defending it and he also successfully rejects Crisp's intuitions concerning aspects of Egalitarianism.
Vallentyne, Peter. "Self-Ownership and Equality: Brute Luck, Gifts, Universal Dominance, and Leximin." Ethics 107.2 (1997): 321-343. The author starts the article by leaning heavily on the views of Egalitarians and the works of Van Parijs. He then provides the framework of the Egalitarian liberal and offers his critique of it. And the author also invents terms that distinguish luck and gifts. He covers Egalitarian Liberalism, control self-ownership, leisure self-ownership, non-brute luck income self-ownership, limited self-ownership, social ownership of natural resources, and Georgist social ownership of natural resources. He then proceeds to cover self-ownership and the limits of taxation. The article is a thorough analysis of the Egalitarian view that covers more than strict Egalitarianism.
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